As previously discussed the McLendon Standard is a rule of repose and strongly disfavors any change that would increase parenting time and promote the best interests of a child. Alabama Code § 30-3-150 states that “[i]t is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of their children and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.” Further, McLendon is repugnant to the codified “general philosophy in this state that children need both parents, even after a divorce, established in [§] 30-3-150". Alabama Code § 30-3-160.
McLendon’s policy of disfavoring shared parenting and promoting limited contact between children and their fit, caring parents predates the adoption of the aforementioned code sections which were adopted in 1997 and 2004, respectively. Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984); Ala. Code § 30-3-150; and § 30-3-160. In short the legislature has abandoned the discriminatory language and stated intent of McLendon. Any conflict between McLendon and the more recently adopted code sections must be resolved in favor of the Code of Alabama. Baldwin County v. Jenkins, 494 So. 2d 584, 588 (Ala. 1986) (“the latest expression of the legislature is the law… Where a conflict exists between statutes, the last enactment must take precedence.”); citing Middleton v. General Water Works & Electric Corporation, 149 So. 351, cert. denied, 227 Ala. 219, 149 So. 352 (1933); and Laney v. Jefferson County, 32 So.2d 542 (1947)). Further, the separation of powers doctrine of the US Constitution dictates that it is the role of the legislature to make laws and the judiciary to interpret them. The legislature has spoken on the issue; therefore a parent’s rights must be enforced. See generally for the principle of the separation of powers doctrine Ex parte Christopher, [No. 1120387], ___So. 3d___ (Ala. 2013).
The McLendon standard is not founded on constitutional doctrines or principles, nor does it proclaim to be. McLendon has been overturned by statute and is thus void. Any attempt to reconcile McLendon with the Code would be a tortured one as the two occupy positions too opposite and too distant to be reconciled. Either the state (and thus its appendage the court) must favor shared parenting rights and responsibilities or it must abandon those priorities for some unstated cause to satisfy McLendon.
McLendon’s policy of disfavoring shared parenting and promoting limited contact between children and their fit, caring parents predates the adoption of the aforementioned code sections which were adopted in 1997 and 2004, respectively. Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984); Ala. Code § 30-3-150; and § 30-3-160. In short the legislature has abandoned the discriminatory language and stated intent of McLendon. Any conflict between McLendon and the more recently adopted code sections must be resolved in favor of the Code of Alabama. Baldwin County v. Jenkins, 494 So. 2d 584, 588 (Ala. 1986) (“the latest expression of the legislature is the law… Where a conflict exists between statutes, the last enactment must take precedence.”); citing Middleton v. General Water Works & Electric Corporation, 149 So. 351, cert. denied, 227 Ala. 219, 149 So. 352 (1933); and Laney v. Jefferson County, 32 So.2d 542 (1947)). Further, the separation of powers doctrine of the US Constitution dictates that it is the role of the legislature to make laws and the judiciary to interpret them. The legislature has spoken on the issue; therefore a parent’s rights must be enforced. See generally for the principle of the separation of powers doctrine Ex parte Christopher, [No. 1120387], ___So. 3d___ (Ala. 2013).
The McLendon standard is not founded on constitutional doctrines or principles, nor does it proclaim to be. McLendon has been overturned by statute and is thus void. Any attempt to reconcile McLendon with the Code would be a tortured one as the two occupy positions too opposite and too distant to be reconciled. Either the state (and thus its appendage the court) must favor shared parenting rights and responsibilities or it must abandon those priorities for some unstated cause to satisfy McLendon.
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